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1. Introduction 
Scots law, no less than the law in any other European country, both reflects 
the society it serves and, by setting out a hierarchy of family forms that it 
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preferences, serves to influence the way in which family life is led. Scottish family 
law, like social attitudes, has been in a state of almost constant flux since the mid-
1970s, and it is noteworthy that the major driver of legal change has been legislative 
rather than judicial. 
 
2. Horizontal Relationships Between Adults 
2.1 Divorce 
In the 1970s the major political debates around marriage concerned its 
termination and, in particular, the place of fault within the termination process. No-
fault divorce was (partially) introduced into Scots law by the Divorce (Scotland) Act 
1976, which restructured the grounds for divorce. Technically, between 1976 and 
2004, there was only one ground for divorce ± that the marriage had broken down 
irretrievably ± though in reality there were five grounds since irretrievable breakdown 
could be shown only by establishing one or more of five stated circumstances. Three 
of these circumstances were fault-based ± adultery, desertion and unreasonable 
behaviour ± and could justify immediate divorce. The innovation came with the other 
two circumstances, which could be shown irrespective of fault: (1) that the parties 
had not cohabited for a period of two years and agreed to divorce, and (2) that the 
parties had not cohabited for a period of five years but the defender did not agree to 
the divorce. An additional ground for divorce, quite separate from irretrievable 
breakdown, was added into the 1976 Act by the Gender Recognition Act 2004 (a UK 
statute): that one of the parties had obtained an interim gender recognition 
certificate. The periods of two and five years were reduced to one and two years 
respectively by the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, which also, consequentially, 
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abolished desertion as a ground for divorce.1 Identical amendments were made by 
the 2006 Act to the grounds for dissolving a civil partnership.2 
 
2.3 Financial Provision on Divorce 
More crucial, perhaps, for the notion of no-fault divorce than the grounds upon 
which it might be obtained was the substantially reduced role that fault now plays in 
the readjustments to the financial position of the parties that it is open to a court to 
make when terminating a marriage or civil partnership. Prior to 1985 the courts had a 
virtually unlimited discretion,3 and though courts were able to make either an order 
for a periodical allowance or for the payment of a capital sum, they tended to prefer 
the former, and reflect in the award their assessment of who was to blame for the 
marital breakdown. All this changed with the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985, which 
favours certainty over flexibility, and a clean break between the parties over 
continued obligation. That Act provides five justifications for granting any financial 
provision (fair sharing of matrimonial property, balancing of advantages and 
disadvantages, fair sharing of the costs of bringing up children, affording dependents 
time to adjust, and relieving serious financial hardship): any claim must be justified 
by one or more of these principles.  The Act also contains structural encouragements 
to the courts to avoid periodical allowances in favour of clean-break transfers of 
capital.4 Conduct is to be left out of account in determining the appropriate financial 
provision, unless the conduct has adversely affected the financial resources 
                                            
1 Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, s 11, amending Divorce (Scotland) Act 1976, s 1(2). 
2 Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, sched 1 para 9, amending Civil Partnership Act 2004, s 117(3). 
3 Divorce (Scotland) Act 1976, s 5. 
4 For details, see Kenneth Norrie in Jens Scherpe (ed.), Marital Agreements and Private Autonomy in 
Comparative Perspective (Hart Publishing, 2012) at pp. 289 ± 310. 
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available, or it would be manifestly inequitable to leave the conduct out of account.5 
Though sometimes criticized as being too inflexible,6 there has been no serious call 
to amend the Scots law of financial provision on divorce since 1985.  There have of 
course been a myriad of cases clarifying how the rules are to be applied,7 but these 
have involved matters of statutory interpretation and there has been no scope for 
judicial development of the policy imperatives underpinning financial readjustment at 
the end of a marriage or civil partnership. 
 
2.4 Same-sex Couples 
The 1990s saw a profound social change in attitudes towards same-sex 
relationships, and that decade also saw a radical shift in judicial perceptions.8 The 
House of Lords recognized in a series of English cases that there was no reason in 
principle why same-sex couples should be unable to access common law remedies 
from which they were not explicitly excluded.9 More importantly, in Fitzpatrick v. 
Sterling Housing Association10 the House of Lords interpreted a statutory provision 
WKDWJDYHEHQHILWWRPHPEHUVRIDGHFHDVHGWHQDQW¶VµIDPLO\¶WRLQFOXGHDVDPH-sex 
couple.11 This case, though its practical effects were limited to a single statutory 
                                            
5 Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985, s 11(7). 
6 See for example the judgment of Lord Hope of Craighead in Miller v Miller, McFarlane v McFarlane 
>@8.+/)RUGLVDJUHHPHQWZLWK/RUG+RSH¶VYLHZVVHH(ric &OLYHµ)LQDQFLDO3URYLVLRQRQ
'LYRUFH¶(GLQ/5DQG.enneth 1RUULHµ&OHDQ%UHDN8QGHU $WWDFN¶-/66-XO\
26. 
7 This is inevitable since the process, like divorce itself, is a judicial process which requires a court 
decision unless the parties can agree amongst themselves. 
8 See further Kenneth 1RUULHµ)URP'HFULPLQDOLVDWLRQWR0DUULage: Changing Political, Judicial and 
Religious Attitudes in the United KingdRPWR*D\DQG/HVELDQ)DPLOLHV¶ in Hanne Petersen (ed), 
Contemporary Gender Relations and Changes in Legal Cultures (Djøf, Copenhagen, 2013), 181 - 
210. 
9 Tinsley v Milligan [1994] 1 AC 340; Wayling v Jones [1995] 2 FLR 1029. 
10 [1999] 4 All ER 705. 
11 It took the European Court of Human Rights a further ten years before it recognized that a same-
sex couple could have a right to respect for their family life under article 8 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (Schalk & Kopf v Austria (2011) 53 EHRR 20) though it had dealt with the very 
issue in Fitzpatrick HDUOLHUXQGHUWKHµSULYDWHOLIH¶SDUWRIDUWLFOHKarner v Austria (2008) 38 EHRR 24. 
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provision, had a profound effect on judicial and legislative thinking, for it signalled 
unambiguously that same-VH[FRXSOHVDVµIDPLO\¶, were to be accorded the respect 
that the law shows to opposite-sex unmarried couples.12 Of more practical 
significance (once that point of principle had been accepted) was the case of 
Ghaidan v. Godin-Mendoza13 where the phrase most commonly used to identify 
unmarried conjugal couples, that is to say couples µOLYLQJWRJHWKer as if husband and 
ZLIH¶ZDVLQWHUSUHWHGWRLQFOXGHVDPH-sex couples ± a step that the House of Lords 
had felt unable to take only five years previously in Fitzpatrick but which was now 
mandated by the Human Rights Act 1998. 
The most significant development for same-sex couples came, of course, in 
2004 when the UK Parliament (with authority to legislate for Scotland in this 
devolved matter conceded by the Scottish Parliament) passed the Civil Partnership 
Act 2004. Part II of this Act applies to Scotland and it creates a civil partnership 
regime that gives to same-sex couples virtually all the rights and responsibilities 
accessible by opposite-sex couples in Scotland through the institution of marriage. 
Civil partnership, as originally designed, did not quite replicate marriage, in its 
method of entry or its rules for exit. Civil partnership may currently be created only by 
civil process at the hands of a district registrar and not also, as marriage may be, by 
a religious celebrant. This, however, changed with the coming into effect, at the end 
of 2014, of the Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014.14 The primary 
purpose of this Act is to open marriage to same-sex couples but it also amends civil 
partnership and will allow civil partnership registration (and same-sex marriages) to 
                                            
12 See Kenneth 1RUULHµ:H$UH)DPLOy (Sometimes): Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships 
After Fitzpatrick¶(GLQ/5 
13 [2004] 2 AC 557. 
14 For details of the full effects of this Act, see Kenneth Norrie, µ1RZWKH'XVWKDV6HWWOHG7KH
Marriage and Civil Partnership (ScoWODQG$FW¶-5 
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be effected at religious DQGµEHOLHI¶ ceremonies,15 and in any place a civil marriage 
might be conducted.16 The two existing differences between marriage and civil 
partnership relating to dissolution will, however, remain even after marriage is 
opened to same-sex couples though only one will affect such couples. First, a civil 
partnership is not voidable, as a marriage is, RQWKHJURXQGRIRQHRIWKHSDUW\¶V
incurable impotency at the time it was entered into17 and the Marriage and Civil 
Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014 explicitly restricts this rule to opposite-sex 
marriages.18 Secondly, adultery, which remains one of the grounds for terminating a 
marriage, is not a ground for dissolving a civil partnership and adultery, as presently 
defined in explicitly heterosexual terms, is to remain a ground for divorce whether the 
marriage is same-sex or opposite-sex.19 
 
2.5 Cohabiting Couples 
Shortly after the passing of the Civil Partnership Act 2004, the Scottish 
Parliament turned its attention to cohabiting couples, that is to say couples who live 
together in a conjugal relationship but who have neither married nor entered a civil 
partnership. Finally enacting the 1990 recommendations of the Scottish Law 
                                            
15 $µEHOLHI¶FHUHPRQ\LVRQHFRQGXFWHGE\SKLORVRSKLFDOorganisations whose beliefs are non-
religious. The proposal is designed to deal with and remove the (rather pleasing) paradox that the 
Humanist Society Scotland, in order to be allowed to conduct marriage ceremonies, was recognized 
E\WKH5HJLVWUDU*HQHUDORI6FRWODQGDVDµUHOLJLRXV¶ERG\ 
16 While English law tends to concentrate on the place of marriage, Scots law has traditionally 
controlled who may conduct the ceremony. The emphasis on place of civil partnership registration 
that currently appears in Part II of the 2004 Act is an alien infection traced to that emphasis in Part I of 
a Westminster-designed statute.  The Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014 scraps the 
process for authorising places, but retains for all civil marriages and civil partnerships a prohibition on 
the place being a religious place. 
17 This is the only ground in Scots law upon which a marriage is voidable (as opposed to void). 
18  Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014, s.5(1). 
19 So a same-sex couple can have their marriage but not their civil partnership terminated if one of the 
parties indulges in heterosexual intercourse: Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014, 
s.5(2) (inserting a new s.1(3A) into the Divorce (Scotland) Act 1976. 
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Commission,20 the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 substantially extends the existing 
legal consequences of cohabitation. Section 25 defines µcohabitDQW¶DVVRPHRQHZKR
lives with another as if they were husband and wife or as if they were civil partners. 
There is no requirement for the cohabitation to have subsisted for any particular 
period of time, though the discretionary element allows the judge to take length into 
account in determining the award to make. The two major provisions relating to 
cohabitants are sections 28 and 29, dealing with financial claims at the termination of 
the relationship by, respectively, separation or death. The crucial feature of both 
these sections is that the financial claims that an ex-cohabitant may make against 
WKHRWKHURUWKHRWKHU¶VHVWDWHDUHGHOLEHUDWHO\GHVLJQHGWREHOHVVYDOXDEOHDQGIURP
a judicial perspective much more discretionary, than those available to ex-spouses 
and ex-civil partners. 
Section 28 allows the court, on the application made within a year of the 
termination of the cohabitation, to make (1) µDQRUGHUUHTXLULQJWKHRWKHUFRKDELWDQW
WRSD\DFDSLWDOVXPRIDQDPRXQWVSHFLILHGLQWKHRUGHUWRWKHDSSOLFDQW¶WDNLQJ
account of (a) whether (and if so to what extent) the defender has derived economic 
advantage from contributions made by the applicant and (b) whether (and if so to 
what extent) the applicant has suffered economic disadvantage in the interests of the 
defender and (2) µan order requiring the defender to pay such amount as may be 
specified in the order in respect of the economic burden of caring, after the end of 
the cohabitation, for a child of whom the cohabitants are the parents¶.21 The statute 
deliberately avoids identifying the reason why the court should make any award at 
                                            
20 Scottish Law Commission, Report on Family Law (Scot Law Com No 135, 1990). 
21 Though the disadvantages relevant to the first claim may include those constituted by the costs of 
bringing up any child iUUHVSHFWLYHRIWKDWFKLOG¶VSDUHQWDJHDGLUHFWFODLPIRUVKDULQJWKHFRVWVRI
bringing up a child may be made only in respect of a child whose parents are the cohabitants 
themselves. 
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all, which is very different from the highly structured OLVWRIµMXVWLILFDWLRQV¶WKDW
underpin a claim for financial provision on divorce: the Scottish Parliament took the 
view that the circumstances of cohabiting couples are likely to be so diverse and 
individual that it would be inappropriate to restrict the discretion of the courts. The 
Court of Session, in the first appeal case, took a very restrictive view and held that 
the purpose of section 28 was to ameliorate only µclear and quantifiable¶ 
disadvantages suffered by one party acting with the intention of benefiting the other; 
the Supreme Court, however, took a much more expansive view.22  According to 
Lady Hale the starting point should be to compare the position of the parties at the 
start of the cohabitation with their position at the end, and to make such order as 
would fairly reflect the difference. Lord Hope rejected the Court of SesVLRQ¶V
conclusion that any disadvantage suffered by one cohabitant was recoverable only if 
intended to confer a benefit on the other: rather, any disadvantage suffered in the 
furtherance of the relationship is potentially recoverable. He also drew attention to 
the background papers relating to the Act, including the Scottish Law Commission¶s 
1990 Report on Family Law and various ministerial statements made as the Bill was 
going through the Scottish Parliament, before concluding that, though the word does 
noWDSSHDULQVHFWLRQµIDLUQHVV¶LVDWWKHKHDUWRIWKHprovision. It follows that 
judges must attempt to achieve a fair result by making such order as evens out the 
financial imbalances caused by the cohabitation. 
Section 29 of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 has so far generated less 
case law though it is even more discretionary than section 28. The purpose of 
section 29 is to allow a surviving cohabitant to claim an award from the net intestate 
                                            
22 Gow v Grant 2012 UKSC 29. 
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(but not testate)23 estate of their now-deceased cohabitant. It is explicitly provided 
that the amount a cohabitant might be awarded by a court can never be greater than 
the amount that a surviving spouse would receive,24 and in addition a number of 
factors are set out that the court must take into account, including the size and 
nature of the estate, any benefit received by the survivor on or in consequence of the 
GHFHDVHG¶s death, and the nature of any other claims on the estate.  In Savage v. 
Purches,25 the first decision on section 29, the sheriff took account both of the short 
period of time the parties had cohabited and the fact that the applicant had received 
a pension benefit on the death of his ex-partner, concluding that both factors 
militated against making any award to the applicant which would defeat or reduce 
WKHFODLPVRQLQWHVWDF\RIWKHGHFHDVHG¶VKDOI-sister. In Windram, Applicant,26 on the 
other hand, the parties had cohabited for over 20 years and had two children 
together ZKRZRXOGVXFFHHGWRWKHLUIDWKHU¶VHVWDWHXQGHUWhe normal rules of 
succession). Though the surviving cohabitant received a small amount from the 
GHFHDVHG¶VSHQVLRQIXQGWKHFRXUWRUGHUHGWKDWDQDPRXQWVXIILFLHQWWRDOORZKHUWR
purchase outright the family home from the estate should be awarded: otherwise her 
children would succeed to the property leaving her without resources 
notwithstanding that she would be responsible for their upkeep for some years to 
come. The sheriff in this case emphasizHGµIDLUQHVV¶DVWKHJXLGLQJSULQFLSOH, as it 
was in section 28.  However, in Kerr v Mangan27 the Inner House of the Court of 
Session held that µIDLUQHVV¶FRXOGQRWEHWKHJXLGLQJSULQFLSOHLQVHFWLRQVLQFHWKH
issue was a balance between the survivor and the heirs in intestacy ± it was not a 
                                            
23 Surviving spouses and civil partners have claims in Scots law that can defeat testamentary 
provisions. 
24 Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, s 29(4). 
25 2009 SLT (Sh Ct) 36. 
26 2009 Fam LR 157. 
27 [2014] CSIH 69. 
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balance of fairness between the two cohabitants.  The Court strongly criticised the 
current wording of section 29 on the ground that it gave wide discretion to the judge 
but no indication at all as to how the judge was to exercise that discretion.  They 
called on the Scottish Parliament to implement the Scottish Law Commission¶V
Report on Succession28 ZKLFKKDGUHFRPPHQGHGVHFWLRQ¶VUHSHDODQG
replacement with a clearer (and very different) rule for cohabitants.  The Scottish 
Government is, as this chapter is being written, consulting on the matter. 
 
3. Vertical Relationships: Parents and Children 
3.1 Parental Responsibilities and Parental Rights 
Radical change in Scottish child law came with the passing of the Children 
(Scotland) Act 1995. In common with other statutes across the world around that 
time, the 1995 Act attempted to effect a fundamental shift in attitudes towards the 
nature of the parent-child relationship, from one of parental rights to one of parental 
responsibilities.29 Importantly, these responsibilities are designed to last beyond the 
end of the relationship between the parents. Prior to 1995, though parents who were 
married to each other had joint rights to determine how the child was to be brought 
up, on parental separation the courts saw their role (always based on the best 
interests of the child30DVµDZDUGLQJ¶FXVWRG\RIWKHFKLOGWRRQHSDUHQWSHUPLWWLQJLI
appropriate access to the child by the other parent. There always was something 
LQKHUHQWO\LOORJLFDOLQDFRXUWJUDQWLQJµFXVWRG\¶WRDSDUHnt in these circumstances, 
                                            
28 Scot. Law Com. No 215 (2009). 
29 7KH$FWUHWDLQVDQGGHOLPLWVµSDUHQWDOULJKWV¶EXWWKHVHDUHH[SOLFLWO\VWDWHGWRH[LVWµLQRUGHU
WRHQDEOH>WKHSDUHQW@WRIXOILOKLVSDUHQWDOUHVSRQVLELOLWLHV¶V 
30 Law Reform (Parent and Child) (Scotland) Act 1986, s 3(2), prior to which, Guardianship of Infants 
Act 1925, s 1. 
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because that parent already had what the court decree seemed to be conferring.31 In 
truth, the real (and intended) effect of a custody order was not to grant custody to the 
primary carer but to remove the custodial rights of the other parent. 
7KH&KLOGUHQ6FRWODQG$FWWKRXJKUHWDLQLQJWKHFKLOG¶VZHOIDUHDVWKH
paramount consideration in any dispute brought before the court,32 abolished the 
concept of custody as an order that excluded the non-resident parent. In its place a 
parent (or indeed anyone else with an interest33) LVDEOHWRVHHNDµUHVLGHQFH order¶, 
which is an order regulating the arrangements as to with whom the child under the 
age of sixteen years is to live.34 But a residence order does no more than it says and 
the right of the non-UHVLGHQWSDUHQWWREHLQYROYHGLQWKHFKLOG¶VXSEULQJLQJLV
unaffected unless explicitly removed.35 The practical result of the change, and it is 
significant, is that while prior to 1995 a non-resident parent had to persuade the court 
KRZLWZRXOGIXUWKHUWKHFKLOG¶VZHOIDUHIRUKLPWRUHPDLQDGHFLVLRQ-maker in the 
FKLOG¶VOLIH jointly with the residence parent, since 1995 it is for the residence parent 
to persuade the court how it would further the FKLOG¶VZHOIDUHWRH[FOXGHWKHQRQ-
resident parent from that role.36 
International standards are reflected in the 1995 Act. So the court is 
constrained not to make any order unless it considers that it would be better for the 
child that the order be made than that none should be made at all.37 This is 
                                            
31 6HFWLRQRIWKH/DZ5HIRUP3DUHQWDQG&KLOG6FRWODQG$FWGHILQHGµSDUHQWDOULJKWV¶WR
LQFOXGHµFXVWRG\RUDFFHVV¶ 
32 Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s 11(7)(a). 
33 µ,QWHUHVW¶LQWKLVFRQWH[WLs interpreted very liberally for the Scottish courts have never imposed 
artificial limitations on who can seek a court order in respect of a child, preferring to allow the court to 
move immediately to the substance of the dispute, which is what is best for the child. 
34 Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s 11(2)(c). 
35 Which might happen under the 1995 Act, s 11(2)(a). 
36 There is, however, no formal burden of proof: White v White 2001 SC 689. 
37 Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s 11(7)(a). 
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described as the minimum intervention principle, or the no-order presumption. It 
reflects, if imperfectly, the requirement imposed by ECHR jurisprudence that any 
state intervention in family and private life be proportionate to the legitimate aim to 
be achieved. Similarly, article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
the Child is given effect to by the statutory requirement that the child be given an 
opportunity to express views, and that the court shall have regard to any views 
expressed by the child.38 It is important to note that this is a self-standing provision 
and is not (as in English law) simply an aspect of WKHFKLOG¶VZHOIDUH 
The welfare of the child remains, of course, the paramount consideration in all 
court actions, but the protean nature of that concept means that the courts are 
required to flesh out the factors that they consider will either enhance or threaten the 
FKLOG¶VZHOIDUH7KHVHIDFWRUVDUHVXEMHFWWRconstant reappraisal, as may be 
illustrated by the way the issue of sexual orientation has been treated. As late as 
1990 the Scottish court was so concerned about maternal lesbianism that it 
considered it better to remove an eight-year-old boy from the mother with whom he 
had always lived and deliver him into the custody of a father who had not previously 
been directly involved in his upbringing and who had two convictions for child 
neglect.39 By 1997, however, in an adoption application uncontested by anyone 
except the judge at first instance40 on the basis of concerns that the applicant was a 
gay man, the Inner House overruled the rejection of the application on the ground 
that it was illegitimate for a judge to decide cases on the basis of his own 
preconceptions relating to homosexuality.41 The case was a watershed in judicial 
                                            
38 Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s 11(7)(b).  
39 Early v Early 1990 SLT 221. 
40 Since 2012 the Lord President of the Court of Session. 
41 T, Petitioner 1997 SLT 724. 
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attitudes towards homosexuality and courts no longer assume that the minority 
sexual orientation affects parenting negatively. 
 
3.2 Adoption of Children 
Adoption law in Scotland underwent its most radical change in 1975 when the 
Children Act 197542 restructured the earlier conception of adoption into a radical 
transference not only of parental responsibilities and parental rights from the birth 
parents to the adoptive parents but also of parenthood itself. This new configuration 
of adoption was followed in the Adoption (Scotland) Act 1978 and again, more 
recently, in the Adoption and Children (Scotland) Act 2007, which contains the 
current law. The most publicly discussed (but hardly the most significant) change 
made by the 2007 Act was to extend eligibility to adopt. Joint adoption applications 
could under the earlier legislation be made only by married couples; now a joint 
DSSOLFDWLRQPD\EHPDGHE\DµUHOHYDQWFRXSOH¶ZKLFKLVGHILQHG43 to mean married 
couples, civil partners, and persons who are living together as if husband and wife, 
or as civil partners, in an enduring family relationship.44 This is an important 
DFFHSWDQFHWKDWDFKLOG¶VZHOIDUHLVWKUHDWHQHGneither by being brought up by a 
couple who have eschewed marriage, nor by being brought up by homosexuals. 
 
                                            
42 A UK statute, applicable in England and Wales also. 
43 Adoption and Children (Scotland) Act 2007, s 29(3). 
44 This is a double test of living together and being members of an enduring family relationship. The 
English decision (on different statutory wording) in Re T (Adoption) [2011] 1 FLR 1487 that a couple 
who did not live together but who were nevertheless in an enduring family relationship could adopt a 
child jointly, would not be open to the Scottish courts. 
14 
 
3.3 Parenthood Through Artificial Reproduction 
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 is a UK statute applying 
equally in England and Wales and in Scotland. Parenthood was, under its 
predecessor statute ± the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 ± conferred 
upon the husband of a woman who underwent infertility treatment (unless it was 
shown that he did not consent to that treatment) and upon the unmarried male 
partner of a woman who underwent such treatment (so long as the treatment was 
provided in licensed premises to the woman and her male partner together). The 
2008 Act amended the latter rule, for children born after the coming into force of that 
Act, so that parenthood is conferred on the (male) partner so long as he consented 
WREHLQJWUHDWHGDVWKHFKLOG¶VIDWKHUDQGLWDSSOLHGERWKUXOHV(with appropriate 
modifications) to female partners of the mother. So the civil partner of the mother will 
be deemed to be the (other) parent of the child unless it is shown that she did not 
consent to the treatment being provided to her partner; and the unregistered female 
partner will be deemed to be the (other) parent of the child so long as she has 
consented to being treated as the parent of the child.45 The provision in the 1990 Act 
that, in determining whether to provide treatment, a service provider had to take 
account of the need of a child for a father46 was amended by the 2008 Act and now 
reads that the service provider must take account of the need of that child for 
supportive parenting. 
 
                                            
45 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, ss 35 and 36, 42 and 43. Being a matter (currently) 
reserved to Westminster, it will require UK legislation to make appropriate amendments to this Act 
when marriage in Scotland is opened to same-sex couples.  The list of reserved matters is of course 
currently under review following the Scottish Independence Referendum in September 2014. 
46 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, s 13(5). 
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3.4 Child Protection 
The Scottish Parliament has more recently turned its attention to issues of 
FKLOGSURWHFWLRQDQGWKHVWDWH¶VGXWLHVWRZDUGVFKLOGUHQWKDWLWORRNVDIWHU7KH
chiOGUHQ¶VKHDULQJ± 6FRWODQG¶VXQLTXHtribunal for dealing with children who have 
offended and children who are at risk from their family or social circumstances47 ± 
was renewed and UHVWUXFWXUHGE\WKH&KLOGUHQ¶V+HDULQJV6FRWODQG$FW
Perhaps one of the most remarkable features of the 2011 Act is that, other than 
putting the system on a national (as opposed to local) basis and making some 
adjustments to ensure compatibility with the European Convention on Human 
Rights,48 the underlying philosophy of the system remains as it was in previous 
legislation,49 having been designed by the Kilbrandon Committee, whose report was 
published in 1964.50 Political and social changes since 1964 have had little effect on 
principles underpinning how WKHFKLOGUHQ¶VKHDULQJsystem operates today. The 
Kilbrandon Report was commissioned in 1961 by a Conservative Government, 
enacted by a Labour Government in 1968, re-enacted in 1995 by a Conservative 
Government and restructured in 2011 by a Scottish Nationalist Government with 
seemingly no regard to changes in the ideology of either juvenile justice or child 
protection. 
VDZWKHLQWURGXFWLRQRIµSHUPDQHQFHRUGHUV¶DVDQRWKHUZHDSRQLQORFDO
DXWKRULWLHV¶FKLOGSURWHFWLRQDUPRXU\51 These are designed to act as a sort of sub-
adRSWLRQRUGHUZKHQLWLVFOHDUWKDWLQRUGHUWRHQVXUHWKHFKLOG¶VVDIH and 
                                            
47 See generally, Kenneth Norrie &KLOGUHQ¶V+HDULQJVLQ6FRWODQG (3rd edn. 2013). 
48 For example, legal aid is for the first time made available for children and their parents attending 
FKLOGUHQ¶VKHDULQJVDQGWKRVHZKRKDYHIDPLO\Oife with the child are given standing to argue before 
the hearing that their existing family life should not be interfered with by any order the hearing might 
wish to make. 
49 Prior to the 2011 Act the rules were contained in Part II of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995; prior to 
1995 the rules were contained in the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968. 
50 Report on Children and Young Persons, Scotland &PQGµ7KH.LOEUDQGRQ5HSRUW¶ 
51 Adoption and Children (Scotland) Act 2007, ss 80 ± 104. 
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satisfactory upbringing, the child must be kept away from his or her birth parents 
permanently, but for whatever reason an adoption is either unlikely or inappropriate 
(at the current time)$SHUPDQHQFHRUGHUZLOOWUDQVIHUWKHULJKWWRUHJXODWHWKHFKLOG¶V
residence to the local authority, and may in addition allocate the other parental 
responsibilities and parental rights between the local authority, the permanent carer 
of the child, and the birth-parents, depending upon what is appropriate in the 
particular circumstances of the individual case. The order may contain authority for 
the child to be adopted, which will obviate the need for parental consent if, 
subsequently, an adoption order is sought over the child. There has as yet been little 
academic analysis of the operation of permanence orders, but the reported cases 
suggest that they are bedding down smoothly and proving, for some children, a 
valuable route to a secure upbringing.  The major issue for the future, currently 
generating case law in relation to children¶s hearings, is to ensure the right to 
participate in care proceedings is fully recognised and protected. 
 
4. Individual Family Law 
4.1 Status of Children 
The remaining effects of illegitimacy on the child were removed by the Law 
Reform (Parent and Child) (Scotland) Act 1986, section 1(1) of which (then headed 
µ/HJDO(TXDOLW\RI&KLOGUHQ¶SURYLGHGDVRULJLQDOO\SDVVHGWKDWµWhe fact that a 
person's parents are not or have not been married to one another shall be left out of 
account in establishing the legal relationship between the person and any other 
person; and accordingly any such relationship shall have effect as if the parents 
were or had been married to one anRWKHU¶7KLVZDVnever quite true, for the parental 
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responsibilities and parental rights HQMR\HGE\WKHFKLOG¶V father remained dependent 
upon whether the father was or had been married to the mother.52  It was not until 
2006 that the 1986 Act was amended by the insertion of a new section 1(1) (with a 
QHZKHDGLQJµ$EROLWLRQRI6WDWXVRI,OOHJLWLPDF\¶), which now SURYLGHVµ1RSHUVRQ
whose status is governed by Scots law shall be illegitimate; and accordingly the fact 
that a person's parents are not or have not been married to each other shall be left 
out of account in²(a) determining the person's legal status; or (b) establishing the 
OHJDOUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHSHUVRQDQGDQ\RWKHUSHUVRQ¶53 The practical effect is 
that the unmarried father of any child whose birth is registered on or after 4th May 
2006 (when the 2006 Act came into force) has the same parental responsibilities and 
parental rights as the married father.54 
 
4.2 Gender Status 
In common with most other legal systems, Scots law has always assumed a 
binary model of gender, even though it has for many centuries been recognized that 
some individuals do not fit readily into that model. The issue of marital capacity of 
µhermaphrodites¶ provided a rich source of contention for the canon lawyers and, 
lDWHU6FRWODQG¶V,nstitutional authors,55 but the binary model itself has never been 
challenged and every person is allocated (and registered with) one or other of the 
genders µmale¶ or µfemale¶ at birth. Even the Gender Recognition Act 2004 is based 
                                            
52 This position was endorsed by the European Court of Human Rights in McMichael v. United 
Kingdom (1995) 20 EHRR 205. 
53 Law Reform (Parent and Child) (Scotland) Act 1986, s. 1 as amended by Family Law (Scotland) Act 
2006, s 21. 
54 Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, s 23. 
55 Stair. Institutions of the Law of Scotland (1681) 1, 4, 6; Forbes, Institutes of the Law of Scotland 
(1722) 1, 1, 20 (following Grotius, Jurisprudence of Holland, 1, 3, 6). 
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on this binary model.56 It has always been possible to correct the Register of Births, 
but only if error in the original registration of gender can be shown. So in X, 
Petitioner57 a correction was refused to a man in his 50s who had undergone, 
apparently naturally, physical changes that rendered his body more female than 
male on the basis that the statutory provisions upon which he founded were 
designed to correct erroneous entries and not to record subsequent changes. Error 
was, however, found in Forbes Sempill, Petitioner58 where the petitioner had, on 
birth, been registered as female and had been brought up as a girl but, in adulthood, 
had started to live as a man. He obtained a correction of his birth certificate in 1952, 
on the basis that his external genitalia were ambiguous and that an error had been 
made at the time of his birth. On the death, childless, of his elder brother the 
question of succession to a baronetcy that transmitted only through the male line 
arose and Lord Hunter in the Court of Session held that in such cases of µintersex¶ or 
hermaphrodite individuals the law would allocate the person to the sex with the more 
predominant characteristics. Importantly, one of the characteristics he held relevant 
in determining that predominance was the psychological perception, or self-identity, 
of the individual ± which is to be compared with the slightly later English transgender 
case of Corbett v. Corbett59 where that aspect was dismissed as irrelevant. 
By the turn of the 21st century, the United Kingdom had fallen far behind most 
other European jurisdictions in allowing individuals who were born of one gender to 
                                            
56 6RLVWKH(TXDOLW\$FWZKLFKLQFOXGHVDVDSURWHFWHGFKDUDFWHULVWLFµJHQGHUUHDVVLJQPHQW¶
defined in s 7 to mean those who are proposing to, are changing or have changed sex but does not 
FRYHUµLQWHUVH[¶LQGLYLGXDOV$ORQHO\VWDWXWRU\DFNQRZOHGJHPent of the existence of intersex 
individuals is found in the Offences (Aggravation by Prejudice) (Scotland) Act 2009, which includes 
ZLWKLQWKH$FW¶VWHUPVµLQWHUVH[XDOLW\¶DQGµDQ\RWKHUJHQGHULGHQWLW\WKDWLVQRWVWDQGDUGPDOe or 
IHPDOHJHQGHULGHQWLW\¶: s 2(8). 
57 1957 SLT (Sh Ct) 61. 
58 Unreported: 12 December 1967, Court of Session (Outer House); discussed by AIL Campbell in 
µ6XFFHVVIXO6H[LQ6XFFHVVLRQ¶-5DQG 
59
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be treated for legal purposes as belonging to the other gender, and that position was 
for many years accepted by the European Court of Human Rights to involve no 
contravention of the European Convention60 EHIRUHWKDW&RXUW¶VSDWLHQFHZLWKWKH
United Kingdom finally snapped in Goodwin v United Kingdom.61 That led directly to 
the passing of the Gender Recognition Act 2004, which introduced a mechanism for 
the legal acceptance of gender reassignment. Even before then, however, the House 
of Lords had held that the law could, in some circumstances at least, include within a 
statutory reference to µman¶ and µwoman¶ individuals who, having been born one 
gender, now lived their lives as the other.62 The Gender Recognition Act 2004 
contains some exceptions to the otherwise general recognition of a change of 
gender,63 and a serious inconvenience if the person who seeks a gender recognition 
certificate is married or in a civil partnership,64 which is only partially resolved by the 
opening of marriage to same-sex couples.65 
 
                                            
60 Rees v United Kingdom (1986) 9 EHRR 56; X, Y and Z v United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 143; 
Sheffield & Horsham v United Kingdom (1998) 27 EHRR 163. 
61 (2002) 35 EHRR 18. 
62 A v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2004] UKHL 21, followed in relation to pensionable 
age (when UK pension rules treated men differently from women) in Grant v UK (2007) 44 EHRR 1 
and Timbrell v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2010] EWCA (Civ) 701. 
63 ([FOXGHGIURPWKH$FW¶VHIIHFWVDUHVXFFHVVLRQWRWLWOHVRIKRQRXUDQGJHQGHU-specific offences: ss 
15 and 20. The Equality Act 2010, s 195 also excludes some sports. 
64 Currently such an individual may be issued with an interim gender recognition certificate that has no 
effect except to allow a speedy divorce or dissolution, leaving the couple free to marry or civilly 
empartner in the gender-appropriate institution. 
65 The Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act retains civil partnership as a gender-specific 
relationship.  A married couple may now remain married but the transgender partner still needs to 
obtain an interim gender recognition certificate (which gives a ground of divorce) followed by a full 
gender recognition certificate ± granted by the gender recognition panel if the spouse consents or by 
the sheriff if the spouse does not consent.  Thus in Scotland the spouse has no veto on the obtaining 
of the full certificate..  
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5. Future Challenges 
The earlier push for gender equality in Scottish family law has led more 
recently to a movement towards sexuality neutrality, which is substantially (though 
not wholly) achieved with the coming into force of the Marriage and Civil Partnership 
(Scotland) Act 2014.  That Act, like earlier developments, is based fundamentally on 
the proposition that sexual orientation is morally neutral. The main challenge for the 
law, reflected in the Parliamentary debates and some of the provisions in the 2014 
Act, is to give effect to that proposition while at the same time creating the space for 
those who deny it to maintain their own freedom of speech and of religion without 
changing their practices.  
 
Other challenges remain for the law, such as in particular ensuring the 
effectiveness of remedies (both protective and punitive) for domestic violence and 
the enforceability of contact orders. Work still needs to be done to ensure that child 
law is consistent with international norms and requirements as contained in the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and the European Convention on Human 
Rights. The Scottish Government is strongly (and rightly) resisting calls for the UN 
&RQYHQWLRQWREHµLQFRUSRUDWHG¶LQWR6FRWVODZLQWKHVDPHZD\WKDWWKH(&+5LV
incorporated, preferring instead an approach of ensuring that all child law and policy 
is effectively and regularly audited for consistency with the UN Convention.66 The UN 
Committee on the Rights of the Child has in the past criticizHGWKH8.IRU6FRWODQG¶V
failure to ban parents from visiting corporal punishment on their children, but the 
Scottish Government has no plans to make any changes to the law as now 
contained in section 51 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003. The Children 
                                            
66 See Part 1 of the Children and Young People (Scotland) Act 2014. 
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and Young People (Scotland) Act 2014 articulates much more strongly than at 
present the rights that children have across the public sector, with positive duties on 
public bodies to work together to design, plan and deliver their policies and services 
IRUWKHLPSURYHPHQWRIFKLOGUHQ¶VDQG\RXQJSHRSOH¶VZHOObeing. Services for young 
people leaving state care are extended to age 26WKHFRQFHSWRIµFRUSRUDWH
SDUHQWLQJ¶LVJLYHQVWDWXWRU\IRUFHDQGFRQWHQWDQGnew provisions are introduced to 
support the parenting role of kinship carers. The key challenge ahead facing Scottish 
family law is to ensure that these sound aspirations actually make a difference, for 
WKHEHWWHULQWKHOLYHVRI6FRWODQG¶VFKLOGUHQ 
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